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1 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Survey Existing Arrangements Relating to the Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence

1. Subject report has been reviewed in detail, and as indicated in paragraph 2 below, the proposed DCID 3/4 is considered to have serious long-term shortcomings from the standpoint of providing the scientific and technical intelligence required for national security. However, it is recognized that these shortcomings may be the necessary price to pay for the acceptance by the Military Services of the basic principles enumerated in paragraph 1 of the proposed DCID 3/4, and that the solution reflected in DCID 3/4 may be a required quid pro quo for interagency collaboration in other intelligence problems. If the decision is made that these factors outweigh the shortcomings, this office will comply wholeheartedly with DCID 3/4 and will make every possible effort toward its effective implementation throughout the intelligence community, and also will be prepared to perform the research and production functions set forth in paragraph 4, below.

2. The major shortcomings of the proposed DCID 3/4 are:

a. Official sanction and impetus are withdrawn for the continuing development of a central focal point for scientific and technical intelligence. An underlying reason for the success of British scientific intelligence during World War II was the existence of such a focal point. The need for its establishment in the US was the core of the recommendations of previous surveys of recognized stature i.e., the [REDACTED] Committee, and also was the basis for the JCS [REDACTED] - [REDACTED] agreement in 1947 which initiated the present CIA scientific intelligence effort.


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b. Except in the case of atomic energy intelligence, the essential concept of formal, authoritative, and coordinated community effort is rejected. Conditions are introduced which may well stimulate further autonomy of effort with an increased

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2. The conclusions of the Scientific Estimates Committee will not be binding on its member agencies. Therefore, those conclusions, as well as the supporting evidence and its varying interpretations, will be debated at the meetings of the National Estimates Board and the IAC Representatives. If SEC is to be of significant value in the production of national intelligence, it should submit its conclusions and dissents to final review, and adjudication if required, by a group of impartial scientific and technical experts from outside the intelligence community, such as the panel which has been established in the field of atomic energy intelligence.

3. It is felt that the permanent membership of the SEC should not include a representative from the AEC. Inasmuch as the field covered by JAEIC is specifically excluded from SEC's area of responsibility, it is considered that AEC does not have sufficient interest or competence in SEC's field to warrant permanent membership.

4. In the light of recent discussions, it is understood that the research and production responsibilities of O/SI will continue substantially as follows:

a. Within its area of primary production responsibility as delineated in USCIB 3/4, O/SI will conduct such research in depth, and will produce such intelligence as may be required for purposes of national intelligence, for Chapter VII of the EIS, and to meet the needs of other agencies.

b. O/SI will continue to provide the basic, current, and staff intelligence (including that within the area of primary production responsibility of the Military Services) required by the EIS and other officers and offices of CIA for fulfillment of their legal responsibilities. In so far as possible, O/SI will obtain the intelligence it needs from other agencies, but will conduct the research required to determine the accuracy and adequacy of such intelligence and to fulfill requirements which are not met by other agencies.

c. O/SI will continue to have the responsibility for providing O/EI with objective and technically competent interpretation of the evidence on scientific and technical matters as a counter-

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6. It is understood that on the issuance of DIRM 3/1 the present responsibility of O/SI for the coordination of scientific and technical intelligence activities will be withdrawn. It is assumed that you will provide a directive indicating the nature of extent of future functions in this field.

H. MARSHALL CHADWELL  
Assistant Director  
Scientific Intelligence

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